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Spatial and historical determinants
of
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2. Quantitative analysis
Bertrand M. Roehner1
Institute for theoretical and High Energy Physics, University of Paris 6
Abstract In part 1 we have discussed the role played by geographical and historical
conditions. Here we wish to test our model and to estimate its parameters. Ti this
effect two indexes are introduced. The geographical index is aimed at characterizing
the degree of separateness of a given region with respect to the national state to which
it belongs. This index turns out to be closely connected to the number of minority-
speakers; it is also correlated with the level of separatist disturbances, at least for
samples having the same historical background. The purpose of the second index is
precisely to specify the role of past episodes in shaping current separatist outbreaks.
To a large extent, current episodes are modeled on former ones; typically this process
of semi-replication appears to be characterized by a “memory” that extends over at
least one and a half century. Note that this study concentrates on the occurrence
and forms of separatist struggles rather than on their short-term political causes.
In so doing, it follows a methodological track that has been pioneered by Stanley
Lieberson (1985, the “stardom” paradigm) and Charles Tilly (1993, the “traffic jam”
paradigm).
5 June 2017. Comments are welcome.
1: Postal address: LPTHE, University Paris 6 (Pierre and Marie Curie), 4 Place Jussieu, 75005 Paris
Email address: roehner@lpthe.jussieu.fr
Phone: 33 1 44 27 39 16
2Introduction
In the first part of this study, thereafter referred to as paper 1, we have discussed
the relevance of geographical and historical factors in the apparition and long term
evolution of separatist movements. In the present paper we examine how and to
what extent our previous qualitative discussion can be substantiated by quantitative
evidence. This first requires the model delineated in paper I to be defined more
precisely. In section 2 we define a geographical index that describes the degree of
separateness of a given region from the rest of the country. We also introduce a
historical index aimed at summarizing the region’s historical record. In section 3
we analyze mother-tongue maintenance for minority languages. It will be seen that
spatial factors are major determinants as has already been emphasized in a different
context by Lieberson (1975). Next we try to assess the respective role of geograph-
ical and historical factors in a number of separatist movements. Finally, we point
out that in spite of the current vigor of separatist tendencies, a sustained process of
economic centralization is currently under way in most countries; this process seems
to be largely independent of the country’s political structure (i.e. federalist versus
centralized).
Before we proceed a word of caution may be in order. In making our discussion
quantitative, we shall concentrate our attention on a small number of basic factors for
we do not really believe in the explanatory power of high dimensional multivariate
correlation analysis.
Definition of the spatial and historical indexes
How to characterize spatial separateness?
In paper I we used the length of the frontier between a given minority region (a)
and the rest of the country (B) as a way to assess the strength of the interaction
between a and B. We also emphasized that, should there be a contact zone with
another “a-speaking area”, its contribution should be subtracted1. For the purpose
of quantitative tests this definition has to be refined however. In particular, it will
be convenient to use a normalized index whose magnitude will be independent of
the size of the region under consideration. To this end we introduce the following
definition:
Definition 1 We consider a region (a) where a minority language is spoken.
1An illustrative example is provided by the Acadians established in New Brunswick; it is certainly easier for them to
maintain their French mother tongue than it is for those living in other Maritime Provinces; one only needs to mention the
following circumstances: possible contacts with family members who emigrated to Quebec, availability of local French
newspapers, opportunity to watch TV programs from Quebec, etc.
3Let us introduce the following notations:
• l0: length of the coast-line of a
• l+: length of the contact zone of a with the rest of the country (B).
• l−: length of the borderline (if any) of a with another a-speaking area
(A) belonging to a foreign country. Then the index of spatial separateness for
region a is defined as:
g =
l+w+ − l−w−
l0 + l+w+ + l−w−
(1.1)
w+ (respectively w−) is a parameter characterizing the intensity and frequency
of the contacts of region a with B (respectively A).
g is normalized in the sense that it is comprised between −1 and 1.
Examples
It may be enlightening to apply the above definition to a few examples. The following
are illustrative examples (Fig. 1)
• a = Wales, B = Britain : g = 0.52
• a = Alsace, B = France : g = 0.50
• a = Kashmir, B = India : g ≃ −0.30.
In paper I we gave a simple scale for the estimation of w; let us recall it briefly:
• w = 1: for “traditional” societies
• w = 2: for intermediate rural societies
• w = 3: for industrialized societies
So far we did not examine to what extent w is affected by the presence of a national
borderline. Let us discuss the matter on the example of Alsace (France); in spite of
the close links between Alsace and Baden in Germany, it is clear that w+ (contacts
with France) is markedly greater than w− (contacts with Germany) if only for the
obvious reason that French is used as the principal language both in school and in
the administration; whilew+ is clearly equal to 3 the value that should be attributed to
w− is less obvious; indeed w− is much more time dependent than is w+: the number
of Alsatians working in Germany, the attractiveness of German TV programs, and
many other similar conditions are likely to change fairly rapidly in the course of
time. Given all these uncertainties we selected w− = 1 as being a simple and not
quite unreasonable figure.
The case of islands So far, we did not consider the case of islands. Our former
definition would lead to g = 0/l0 = 0. The value g = 0 is clearly too crude.
The matter is discussed in some detail in Appendix C. It leads us to the following
definition.
4Fig. 1 Examples of regions with minorities. The homelands of the minorities are represented without cross-
hatching; the regions where the official language of the state is spoken are represented by ascending cross-
hatching; the regions where the minority language is spoken are represented by descending cross-hatching.
The maps in the left-hand column correspond to the cases mentioned in the right-hand column; the middle
column gives the corresponding values of the geographical index of interaction; the above cases have been
classified by decreasing order of the index (remember that the values of this index are comprised between -1
and 1).
Definition 2 We consider an island (a) where a minority language is spoken.
Let us introduce the following notations:
• d+: average distance between the ports of a and those of the mainland
(B).
• d−: average distance between the ports of a and those of an a-speaking
5region A belonging to a foreign country.
• w+ and w− have the same meaning as in Definition 1.
The index of spatial separateness for island a is defined as:
g =
1
D
w+/d+ − w−/d−
w+/d+ + w−/d−
where D is a normalization factor expressed in hundreds of kilometers as:
D = Max[Inf(d+, d−), 3]
g is normalized in the sense that it is comprised between −0.33 and 0.33.
As a matter of illustration, we apply the above definition to the example of the
Caribbean island of Guadeloupe which is a French territory; in this case d+ = 7, 000
km; the nearest territory having Creole as its official language is Haiti: d− = 500
km; with w+ = 3, w− = 1 (see Appendix C) we obtain: D = d− = 5 and g = 0.05.
Remark As explained in Appendix C, one of the purpose fulfilled by definition 2
is to guaranty a smooth transition between the case of a peninsula (which is ruled by
definition 1) and the case of an island. This can only be achieved in an approximate
way however; indeed it is clear that coastal navigation plays a substantial role in the
case of a peninsula, a factor which has been ignored in definition 1. Such inaccura-
cies should not be taken too seriously however for the main uncertainty stems in fact
from the difficulty of obtaining reliable estimates for the mobilization parameter w.
A quantitative statement of the paronymy hypothesis
In paper I the paronymy assumption has been introduced, formalized and to some
extent confronted to empirical evidence. As may be remembered, we observed a
high degree of historical continuity in the manifestations of separatist feelings. For
the purpose of making paronymy into a quantitative parameter we introduce an index
aimed at assessing the intensity of separatist struggles in the following way.
Definition 3 We consider a region a which is the homeland of a minority; its
resistance to assimilation is characterized by an index h defined in the following
way:
• h = 0, if the region has not been annexed
• h = 1, if there has been a peaceful annexation and no subsequent separatist
claims.
• If there have been separatist disturbances, we take for h the logarithm of
the total number of deaths.
Estimating relaxation times for minority languages
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Fig. 2 Schematic Representation of the two phases in the life of a language. Schematic representation
of the two phases in the life of a language. The equilibrium phase corresponds to average stability in the
number of speakers. The assimilation rate is represented by the slope of the curve. In the equilibrium phase
the assimilation rate is almost equal to zero. During the transition to the fall-off phase, the assimilation rate
gradually increases until the largest part of the population has been assimilated.
The evolution in the number of minority-language speakers
In the life of a language2, two phases should be distinguished: the equilibrium phase
and the assimilation phase.
Fig. 2 schematically represents a typical evolution. Notice that both phases may last
for a very long time. In principle one should also consider the possibility that the
decline may be checked with the subsequent occurrence of a revival phase. Such
cases are very rare however. The so-called linguistic revival that occurred in the
late nineteenth century in a number of countries (Albania, Bielorussia, Flanders,
Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, etc) were of a very different
nature for in such cases the language was still spoken by the people as a dialect or
more precisely as a variety of dialects. The revival rather concerned the recognition
of that dialect as a proper language with its own literary traditions. In contrast, the
possible revival that we consider here refers to the total number of speakers; to our
2In principle one shouldmake a distinction between various ability levels. Four stages may be considered depending on
whether a language is understand, spoken, read or written. In the case of minority languages statistics depend drastically
on which stage one considers. For instance in the Basque Provinces (Spain) the respective percentages are: 50,46,25 and
11; in Catalonia (Spain) they are: 90,77,62 and 38 (Minority Rights Group 1977). Unfortunately, only the number of
speakers is in general recorded and usually with a fairly high margin of error (see in this respect the discussion in Kirk
1946, p.224.
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Fig. 3 Expected Relationship between the Geographical Index (g) and the Assimilation Rate (a). The
geographical index is close to 1 when the region of the minority speakers is surrounded on all sides by majority
speakers; it is close to -1 when that region is better connected to (alien) minority speakers than to majority
speakers. In the first case assimilation occurs fairly quickly (that is to say within two or three generations); in
the second, on the contrary, assimilation is a very problematic outcome.
knowledge only one revival of that kind may currently be under way, namely that
of the Welsh language; still it has to be confirmed by further statistics in coming
decades.
As a first approximation, the decline phase for language a may be described by the
following equation:
p = p0e
−at = p0e
−t/τ (3.1)
where p denotes the percentage of a-speaking people. The coefficient a may be
referred to as the assimilation rate; its inverse τ = 1/a has a simple interpreta-
tion: in the time interval τ the percentage p is divided by a factor 2.7; τ is called
the relaxation time of the decrease phase. The quasi-equilibrium situation which is
schematized by the left-hand part of the curve in Fig.2 corresponds to a very small
assimilation rate, i.e. to a very large relaxation time.
Relationship between the assimilation rate and the geographical index g
The relation that we expect to hold between the assimilation rate a and the geo-
graphical index g is depicted graphically in Fig.3. The following special cases are of
particular significance:
(1) g = 1: Rapid assimilation; example: the “melting-pot” period in the United
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Fig. 4a The counties of Wales. The Welsh language is more spoken in the counties which are far away from
the border with England, that is to say Dyfed and Gwynedd.
States.
(2) g = 0: Equilibrium; examples: French-speaking Swiss or Catalan-speakers in
Spain.
(3) g = −1: Strong language revival; a rather hypothetical situation as we already
noticed.
It can be noted that the rate of assimilation is largely independent of the state’s pol-
icy. Thus, despite of the fact that Romantsch has become a national language (but not
an official language) in Switzerland after the Second World War, its decline not only
continued but even accelerated. The assimilation rate, moreover, is of the same order
of magnitude or even higher than it is for minority languages in more centralized
countries such as Britain or France. While Romantsch was retreating, French and
90
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
2.25
2.5
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Geographical Index
As
sim
ila
tio
n 
Ra
te
 (1
92
1 t
o 1
96
0)
Cwy Dyf
Clw
Pow
MGl
WGlSGl
Gwe
Fig. 4b Observed Correlation between the geographical index (g) and the assimilation rate (a) inWales.
The geographical index has been computed on the following basis: counties with a number of speakers over
50 percent were considered Welsh (only Gwynedd fell in this category), whereas the other counties were con-
sidered as English. The correlation is equal to 0.71 (confidence interval at probability 0.95 is: 0.01 to 0.94).
Signification of the symbols for the counties inWales: Clw: Clwyd; Dyf: Dyfed; Gwe: Gwent; Cwy: Gwynedd;
MGl: Mid Glamorgan; Pow: Powis; SGl: South Glamorgan; WGla: West Glamorgan. Source: See table 4.4 in
Roehner (2002)
Italian preserved their positions in Switzerland; in other words, the potential useful-
ness of the language and the geographical environment seem to be more important
than linguistic policies.
The analysis of separatism
The data
Separatism usually reflects many causes, whether linguistic, religious, cultural, eth-
nic or economic. One could even argue that in joining a separatist struggle each
individual has his own motivations. As a result, it is almost impossible at the level
of an outside observer to distinguish between various sources of separatism. Our
methodological choice therefore was to estimate the overall intensity of separatist
struggles. To this end we converted all major events into a number of fatal casual-
ties. In developing countries where separatist struggles often take the form of open
warfare, this number is almost identical with the estimated number of deaths. On the
contrary, in industrialized societies it provides an equivalent figure for the demon-
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Fig. 4c Observed Correlation between the geographical index (g) and the percentage of Welsh speakers
in 1921. The latter can be considered as providing an estimate for the assimilation rate in the century before
1921. The correlation is equal to -0.65 (confidence interval at probability 0.95 is: -0.92. Signification of
symbols: see previous figure to 0.10). Source: Same as previous figure.
strations, arson attemps, bomb attacks and other forms of protest. Specific details
about equivalence factors are given in Appendix A.
The ceteris paribus condition
In a sense the fact that almost all separatist movements are taking place in long-
standing enclaves is a first proof enough of the significance of spatial determinants;
yet, in order to make the test more quantitative one has to make sure that variations
in other factors shall not spoil the test. In other words, in trying to assess the impact
of the geographical factor g we are confronted with the ceteris paribus requirement.
The following precautions are of crucial importance.
• One should compare separatist movements which are more or less at the same
stage. It would be pointless to compare a situation where national awakening is
just under way (as in Peru or Mexico for instance) with another where national con-
scienceness is fully developed (as in Punjab for instance).
• The type of the polity has an obvious influence on the level and forms of sepa-
ratist disturbances. The latter do not take the same form in a nation that has a long
democratic tradition or in one that has not. The above qualifications are far less cru-
cial in analyzing the impact of the historical factor for, in a sense, the magnitude of
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Fig. 5 Relationship between the geographical index and the level of separatist disturbances for French
provinces and Associated Territories. The geographical index is an estimate of the frequency and intensity
of the interactions between the core of the country and its peripheral regions. The curve is a least-square fit; the
correlation is equal to -0.79. The symbols have the following significations: Als: Alsace; Bas: Basque Country;
Bri: Brittany; Cor: Corsica; Gua: Guadeloupe; Mar: Martinique; NCa: New Caledonia; Occ: Occitania; Tah:
Tahiti. The two almost overlapping circles are the two close islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe.
the historical index reflects (though for an earlier period) both the nature (more or
less violent) of the nationalistic movement and the response (more or less tolerant)
of the state.
Owing to the above arguments, we shall carry out the following tests:
(1) The impact of the geographical factor g (taken alone) is analyzed for separatist
struggles in France: 9 cases.
(2) The impact of the historical factor h is considered separately first for “old”
(i.e. European) countries, and then for “new” countries: 6 and 9 cases respectively.
(3) As a complementary test we examine whether the introduction of the geo-
graphical factor improves the fit already provided by the historical index.
Findings
Geographical index/separatist disturbances
Part of the findings are summarized graphically in Fig.5.
Fig.5 shows the relationship between the spatial index g and the intensity of separatist
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disturbances as measured by the index d. The estimated equation is3:
d = tanh(−1.89g + 1.1) r = −0.77 (−0.22,−0.95)
where r denotes the coefficient of correlation; the figures in parenthesis give the
confidence interval to probability 0.95.
Influence of the historical factor
In this section, we will see that the intensity of separatist struggles in the second half
of the twentieth century is essentially determined by their intensity in the preceding
century, that is, from 1845 to 1945. In other words, separatist struggles are character-
ized by a strong historical continuity. On the level of principles, there is no particular
reason to limit the historical retrospective to one century, but the difficulty of finding
sufficiently precise sources for the earlier periods imposes this limitation. Even the
period 1845–1945 remains full of uncertainties for a number of non-European na-
tions.
In order to estimate the intensity of separatist struggles, we will use the number of
equivalent deaths defined in chapter 6. As we will use that index in two different
time periods we need two different notations: the number of equivalent deaths in the
period 1845–1945 will be called the historical index and denoted by h in order to
distinguish it from the same index in the period 1945–1995 for which we keep the
notation d.
For this study, we will distinguish European and non-European nations, for at least
two reasons. First of all, in the non-European countries, there was often a conquest
phase in the nineteenth century, frequently accompanied by open warfare between
the central power and the autochtonous nations. These wars involved armed conflict
on a grand scale. This characteristic is relatively rare in Europe in the same period.
In addition, in the majority of the countries where there were such wars of conquest,
the numbers of the autochtonous population is rarely known with any accuracy. The
dearth of statistical sources leads us to use an index in which the number of deaths
during separatist disturbances is used straight out and is not related to the overall
population. In order to distinguish these two types of historical indexes, we will call
them h when the deaths are related to the population and h′ when they are not. For
European nations, we then use h, while for the non-European nations we will use h′.
European nations
Figure 8.10a shows how postwar separatist troubles are determined by the level of
separatist disturbances during the preceding century. The coefficient of correlation
between the two variables is equal to 0.56 (with a confidence interval at 95 percent
given by -0.11, 0.89). The regression equation reads:
3The fact that the estimated equation is a tangent rather than a straight line comes from the fact that g is bounded
between −1 and 1; notice however that a linear fit is only slightly less effective: r = −0.71
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Fig. 6a Relationship between the historical index and the level of separatist disturbances for European
nations in the period 1945–1994. The historical index h refers to the period 1845–1945 and is given by:
h = log(number of deaths/population of the minority). The coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.56. The
labels have the following significations: Als: Alsace; Bas: Basque Country; Bri: Brittany; Cat: Catalonia; Cor:
Corsica; Jur: Bernese Jura; Que: Quebec; Sco: Scotland; Wal: Wales; Xin: Xinjian.
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Figure 6b Relationship between the Historical Index and the Level of Separatist Disturbances for Non-
European Nations in the Period 1945–1994. The historical index h′ refers to the period 1845–1945 and is
given by: h′ = log(number of deaths). The coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.68. The labels have the
following signification: Abo: Australian Aborigenes; Ace: Aceh; Haw: Hawaii; Mao: Maoris; Mex: Mexican
Americans in New Mexico and Arizona; Mor: Moros in Mindanao and Jolo (Philippines); Nav: Navajos; Sik:
Siks in Punjab (India); Sio: Sioux.
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d = ah+ b a = 0.39, b = 0.32
where:
d: level of separatist disturbances in the period 1945–1994;
h: level of separatist disturbances in the period 1845–1945;
h = log(number of deaths/population)
We note that since a is smaller than one the intensity of the disturbances has on av-
erage decreased. More specifically the intensity of disturbances has obviously gone
up in Corsica and the Jura, while it has gone down in Catalonia and Quebec.
We can see in Figure 8.10a that two minorities stand out with respect to the regres-
sion line: Catalonia, where past disturbances were too important and Corsica, there
they were too limited. These two cases illustrate the difficulty of tracing a clear
line between separatist disturbances and other kinds of problems. In the statistics
on Catalonia, we included the Carlist wars as well as the 1936–1939 Civil War; in
these conflicts, there was indeed a defense of regional autonomy, but this was not the
only aspect. The conflicts between monarchists and republicans or between social-
ists and conservatives were intertwined with separatist struggles to the point where
a clear separation between them becomes impossible. In the case of Corsica, the
period 1845–1945 was marked by very few openly separatist acts; nevertheless, Cor-
sica underwent chronic banditry during this period (on this topic, see the book by
X. Versini); insofar as this banditry was in opposition to the established order rep-
resented by customs agents and other officers, it can be considered as an form of
separatist struggle. However, it was not included in the statistics that we used.
Non-European nations Figure 8.10b shows the link between postwar separatist
disturbances and those that occurred during the preceding century. The coefficient
of correlation between the two variables is 0.68 (a 95 percent confidence interval is
0.02, 0.92). The regression equation reads:
d = ah′ + b a = 0.78, b = −0.55
where:
d: level of separatist disturbances in the period 1945–1994;
h′: level of separatist disturbances in the period 1845–1945.
In order to determine if there has been an increase or decrease in the rate of dis-
turbances, we can not directly compare d and h′ because these two variables are no
longer defined in the same way. Qualitatively, it is nonetheless clear that the intensity
of disturbances has greatly lessened for Aborigines, Maoris, Mexicans, Navajos and
Sioux.
Basic tendencies in the manifestations of separatist disturbances
In the introductory chapter of “European Revolutions” Charles Tilly develops a sug-
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gestive parallel between revolutions and traffic jams; he notes that like the latter,
revolutions may be difficult to predict but that “once begun, they display recurrent
patterns4”; In this paragraph we undertake the same kind of analysis: taking the oc-
currence of separatist struggles for granted we examine if there are some permanent
patterns in the variety of their forms. The reader should be cautioned that such a
study in microsociology requires very detailed historical information which may not
necessarily be available in every case; consequently, our results may appear some-
what partial and frustrating. In particular the classes of separatist disturbances that
we introduced in Table B1 (Appendix B) are still somewhat too broad. Even so,
Table B2 reveals two notable features.
(1) A progressive decrease in the violence-level from the 19th to the 20th century,
especially in industrialized countries.
(2) A high level of permanence in the forms assumed by separatist disturbances
in a given country in the course of time.
Let us now discuss these two features in some detail. The first statement particularly
applies to the following cases: Basque Provinces (Spain), Brittany, Corsica, Indians
in the United States, Maori (New Zealand), Quebec, Scotland, Wales. Here again,
however, a distinction should be made between European and non-European coun-
tries. In the former (with the exception of Spain) the decrease in the level of violence
already occurred in the period 1850-1945, whereas in the latter it took place only in
the period 1945-1994. This observation comes into proper light if one realizes that
for the period 1945-1994 there was an obvious impossibility for minority groups
in industrialized countries to wage war against the state5. Nowadays, open warfare
can only be used in tropical or mountainous regions and against rather weak states.
The military defeat of the Sikhs in Punjab (1983-1992) in spite of their audacity and
courage was just one other illustration of that evidence.
Regarding the second point one should note that for early time periods, before 1850,
only major disturbances have usually been recorded. Moreover, some of the items
listed in Table B1 (for instance those regarding electoral protests) simply did not
exist. It is difficult to avoid such bias in analyzing and documenting non violent
forms of separatist protest. Even for those events which are on record, one does
usually not have the detailed information that would be required; a demonstration in
Wales for instance is not identical to one in Catalonia. For all these reasons we shall
have to restrict ourselves to only a few examples.
(1) The first example concerns the celebration of the national day (labelled 2Ar in
4In the case of traffic jams such patterns are particularly obvious: efforts of those on the periphery to exit from the
scene and fierce competition for only small advantages for those in the middle.
5The traditional forms of resistance being barred, these peoples will have to shift to new ones; not surprisingly, this is
a lengthly process whose completion may take well over one century.
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Table B1). Almost all national groups have chosen a specific national day, on which
huge gatherings usually take place. In Wales for example the National Eisteddfod
(which means session) assembles thousands of Welshmen; founded in 1450, it has
become a famous national institution. Similar instances are the Diada Nacional
(11 September) in Catalonia; the Day of the Basque Nation (12 April), the Day
of the Jurassian People (8 September), the St Jean-Baptiste (24 June) in Quebec. In
the 1970s national days were often marked by bitter street fighting between young
demonstrators and the police. More generally the purpose of the national day is to
serve as a vital lead and to manifest the nation’s vitality.
(2) To discuss another example of permanent pattern we have selected a case for
which detailed information is available, namely Brittany (France)6. More specifi-
cally, we shall document the fact that in Breton separatist struggles bomb attacks
against French historical memorials constitute a well established tradition. During
the last sixty years there have been at least four actions of that kind.
• 7 August 1932: destruction in Rennes of the memorial commemorating the
reunion of Brittany to France in 1532 (Se´rant 1971).
• 10 October 1973: destruction of the memorial commemorating the last public
speech of general de Gaulle before his resignation in 1969.
• 26 June 1978: destruction by a fire bomb of an aisle of the Chaˆteau of Ver-
sailles.
• November 1993: destruction of the ancient House of Parliament in Rennes; it
was set on fire by demonstrators in doubtful circumstances.
Scotland too showed great interest in historical symbols, but used a different “reper-
toire”; an example was the theft of the “Lia Fail”, a stone used for coronation, in
December 1950.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper we have tried to look at diverse and seemingly unrelated
episodes as manifestations of the same recurrent process in order to bring some kind
of provisional order into a vast and chaotic field. Of the two determinants that we
examined, namely the spatial and historical factors, the latter appears to be predom-
inant in the sense that the strength of nationalist struggles is mainly set by former
episodes and local traditions. But once the impact of this factor has been discounted,
spatial separateness turns out to play a major role in determining the level of sepa-
ratist struggles. This factor is also strongly correlated with the degree of language
maintenance.
6Let us recall that another example (Bernese Jura) has already been analyzed in paper I.
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An agenda for future research We are convinced that the fundamental mecha-
nisms responsible for separatist tendencies have remained basically unchanged since
the beginning of the 19th century. This claim was given some plausibility by examin-
ing a few examples for which data were available. Yet, for lack of quantitative histor-
ical evidence a systematic investigation was not possible. In this respect one should
mention the remarkable work performed by C. Tilly and his collaborators (Horn and
Tilly 1986, Tilly 1992) for England (1758-1834) and also for France. Once a similar
task has been carried out for other countries a systematic investigation of separatist
struggles in the 18th and 19th centuries will become possible. Needless to say, in the
case of South-East or South-West Asian countries this requires a working collabora-
tion with local scholars and librarians.
The future Should one expect a cardinal change in the way people of different
strands are able to communicate with each other? In the wake of the computer rev-
olution a substantial change may be brought about by the introduction of a device
performing automatic speech translation. Such a process would involve the follow-
ing steps:
Language A→ Speech recognition → Automatic translation A/B → Vocal synthesis of language B
It is of course difficult to guess how long it will take for such a device to become
widely used: 30, 75 or 100 years? Yet, even 100 years is a short span of time in
comparison to the stretches of several centuries required by the process of linguistic
assimilation. Such a translation device would give multi-linguistic states a chance to
realize their linguistic unity much more easily that could be expected otherwise.
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Appendix A: The data base
Selection of the minority groups
The minority groups documented below should be seen as a sample of a larger set
of cases. In his comprehensive survey of minorities, T. Gurr (1993) listed 227 com-
munal groups. As we already pointed out in paper I, Gurr used a broader minor-
ity concept. Our definition corresponds approximately to two of Gurr’s five sub-
classes, namely “ethnonationalist groups” and “indigenous people”; for these sub-
classes Gurr’s survey lists a total of 121 groups. Our own selection of about 40 cases
was based on the following criterions.
• Data availability
• Within the previous constraint we tried to make the sample as representative as
possible by selecting minority groups from the five continents.
The first criterion lead us to leave aside countries from the ex-USSR. For the same
reason, minorities in Africa and Asia are under-represented. We also left aside those
separatist struggles which, besides their domestic significance, have become major
issues in international relations. This is for instance the case for Ulster, for former
Yugoslavia, for the Kurd minorities or for Cyprus.
Equivalence factors
In order to build an intensity-index suitable for a great variety of separatist move-
ments, we converted standard separatist events into equivalent numbers of deaths.
The following factors have been used as equivalents for one death:
• Demonstration of one million people
• 30 bombs or 60 arson attempts
• 30 non fatal casualties
• Petition of 100 000 people
Except for the last factor, which has in fact been used rather rarely, the other equiv-
alence factors are based on fairly realistic orders of magnitude. Once the equivalent
number of deaths n has been obtained the intensity index is defined by the logarithm
of n referred to the total minority population p:
d = lg(n/p)
In taking the logarithm we follow a standard practice (see for instance Richardson)
which has two distinctive advantages. (i) it keeps the magnitude of d of the order
of a few units which is appropriate for an index (ii) it minimizes the incidence of
estimation errors.
Sources
Our data set is mainly based on event analysis using major newspapers. Most valu-
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able in that perspective has been the newspaper data base of the “Fondation Na-
tionale des Sciences Politiques” (27 rue Saint Guillaume, Paris). It includes articles
from a variety of papers (in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish) arranged
by countries and topics of interest; the base covers the whole period from 1945 to
present. The coverage is not uniform of course, neither in time nor in space; that
kind of bias is discussed in Olzak (1992); by and large, however, one may subscribe
to S. Olzak’s conclusion that “few alternative sources contain so much information”.
Anyone who has attempted a comparative study based upon published reports not
originally prepared for this purpose has experienced the frustration that arises when
the accounts become mute just at the point where some crucial proposition it to be
tested. Needless to say, we also used monographs and journal articles whenever they
permitted to fill a major gap.
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Appendix B: Forms of separatist disturbances
Categorizing forms of separatist disturbances
We introduce the following classification of separatist manifestations.
1 Official and legal procedures
1A Petitions addressed to the government. Demand for Home Rule
1B Expressing separatist claims in general elections or in (official or unofficial) referendums
1C Lawsuits, to regain lost tribal lands or to get compensation for former abuse
2 Demonstration
2A Demonstration in town
2Ar Annual gathering (national day)
2B March into a city or from one city to another
2C Skirmishes between the demonstrators and the police (or counter-demonstrators)
2D Roadblocking - General strike
2E Taking control of estates, villages, public buildings, etc
2F Military occupation - State of emergency - State of siege
3 Destruction of public or private property
3A Destruction of public property
3Aa by arson
3Ab by bombs
3B Destruction of private property
3Ba by arson
3Bb by bombs
4 Murder
4A Murder of officers
4Ab bombs
4Ash shooting
4Ast stabbing
4B Murder of private citizens
4Bb bombs
4Bsh shooting
4Bst stabbing
5 Murder of several people
5A Attack against police/army posts or patrols
5Ab bombs
5Ash shooting
5B Murder of several private citizens
5Bb car bomb, bomb in public area
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5Bsh shooting
6 Warfare
Table B1 Classification of separatist disturbances. The entries are classified by
order of increasing bitterness and magnitude.
22
Appendix C: The definition of the spatial index for an island
As a typical example let us examine the case of Corsica (France). It is connected
to the continent through a number of shipping lines linking the Corsican ports of
Ajaccio and Bastia to French and Italian ports. First of all we consider relative
distances.
(1) France-Corsica There are three main ports on the French coast: Marseilles,
Nice and Toulon. Distances to Corsican ports are as follows:
Bastia-Nice : 220km Bastia-Toulon : 320km Bastia-Marseilles : 340km
Ajaccio-Nice : 220km Ajaccio-Toulon : 260km Ajaccio-Marseilles : 300km
Average: 276 km
(2) Italy-Corsica There are three main ports an the Italian coast: Genoa, Livorno
and Piombino (facing the Elba island). Distances to Corsican ports are as follows:
Bastia-Genoa : 200km Bastia-Livorno : 130km Bastia-Piombino : 70km
Ajaccio-Genoa : 300km Ajaccio-Livorno : 300km Ajaccio-Piombino : 280km
Average: 216 km
Although the average distance to Italian ports is shorter than to French ports there are
approximatively three times more trips to France than to Italy: about 700 trips/year
against 200 trips/year. Therefore it is not unreasonable to use the following weight-
ing factors:
Contacts with France w+/d+ d+ = 276 w+ = 3
Contacts with Italy w−/d− d− = 216 w+ = 1
Next, let us consider the multiplying factor which has been introduced in definition
2, namely:
1/D, D = Max[Inf(d+, d−), 3]
where the “effective distance” D is expressed in hundreds of kilometers. The role
of this factor is to ensure a reasonable degree of continuity between the case of an
island and that of a peninsula. In particular the factor of separateness g should as
a rule be smaller for an island than for a peninsula. This is achieved through the
term 3 which means that even if d+ and d− are very small (which corresponds to an
island separated from the mainland by a narrow passage of water, as in the case of
the Island of Wight for instance) the effective distance D will be equal to 3 which
accounts for the cost of loading and unloading operations.
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